In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has nice properties -it is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal -and hence it provides an attractive, off-the-shelf method for running an application involving such a market. With matching markets becoming ever more prevalant and impactful, it is imperative to finally settle the computational complexity of this scheme.
Introduction
In a brilliant and by-now classic paper, Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method is incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal. It can be viewed as a marriage between fractional perfect matching and a linear Fisher market, both of which admit not only polynomial time algorithms but also combinatorial ones. These facts have enticed numerous researchers over the years to seek an efficient algorithm for the Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) scheme. The significance of this problem has only grown in recent years, with ever more diverse and impactful matching markets being launched into our economy, e.g., see [ftToC19] .
Our work on resolving this problem started with an encouraging sign, when we obtained a combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for a special case, called the unit case, by melding a prefect matching algorithm with the combinatorial algorithm of [DPSV08] for the linear Fisher market, see Section 4. This algorithm also solved a more general problem, namely bivalued utility functions: for each agent i, the utilities u ij ∈ {a i , b i }, ∀j ∈ G, where 0 ≤ a i < b i . However, this approach did not extend to the general case.
The gamut of possibilities
Before presenting the rest of our results, it is worthwhile pointing out how we got to them. The most useful solution for practical applications would of course have been a combinatorial, polynomial time algorithm for the entire scheme. At the outset, this didn't seem unlikely, especially in view of the existence of such an algorithm for the unit case. Failing this, one could have sought a rational convex program, i.e., a non-linear convex program which always has a rational solution if all parameters are rational numbers [Vaz12] , since then interior point methods could have been employed for solving this program efficiently. However, even this approach had many stumbling blocks.
Next we considered the generalization of the bivalued utilities problem to trivalued utilities, in particular, to the case of {0, 1 2 , 1} utilities. The status of this case is discussed in Section 9. It turns out that underlying the polynomial time solvability of a linear Fisher market is the property of weak gross substitutability 1 . This property is destroyed as soon as one goes to a slightly more general utility function, namely piecewise-linear, concave and separable over goods (SPLC utilities) . Evidence of intractability for the latter case was established using the class PPAD introduced in [Pap94] ; the problem is PPAD-complete 2 [VY11] . It turns out that equilibrium allocations for the HZ scheme do not satisfy weak gross substitutability, e.g., see Example 7. This led us to seek a proof of PPAD-completeness for the scheme. However, a crucial requirement before embarking on such a proof is to show that there is always a rational equilibrium if all parameters of the instance are rational numbers. However, even this is not true; we found an example that admits only irrational equilibria, see Section 6. This example is quite intriguing, as discussed in Remark 17. Furthermore, it admits disconnected equilibria, hence ruling out a convex programming formulation. It was then natural to turn to the class FIXP, introduced in [EY10] , to establish intractability. Our proof of membership in FIXP is presented in Section 8. We leave open the problem of determining if HZ is FIXP-hard.
Related work
We are aware of only the following two computational results on the HZ scheme. Using the algebraic cell decomposition technique of [BPR95] , [DK08] gave a polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilibrium for an Arrow-Debreu market under piecewise-linear, concave (PLC) utilities (not necessarily separable over goods) if the number of goods is fixed. One can see that their algorithm can be adapted to yield a polynomial time algorithm for computing an equilibrium for the HZ scheme if the number of goods is a fixed constant. Extending these methods, [AJKT17] gave a polynomial time algorithm for the case that the number of agents is a fixed constant.
We note that there is a paucity of results showing membership in FIXP and FIXP-hardness for equilibrium problems; for a description of the class FIXP, see Section 7. The quintessential complete problem for this class is Nash equilibrium [EY10]; see Section 7 for a detailed description of this important problem. We are not aware of FIXP-based results for any other game-theoretic solution concepts. For the case of market equilibria, in the economics literature, there are two parallel streams of results: one assumes that an excess demand function is given and the other assumes a specific class of utility functions. We provide below all FIXP-based results we are aware of for both streams.
[EY10] proved FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu markets whose excess demand functions are algebraic. Hence this result is for the first stream and it does not establish FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu markets under any specific class of utility functions. Results for the second stream include proofs of membership in FIXP for Arrow-Debreu markets under Leontief and piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility functions in [Yan13] and [GMV16] , respectively. This was followed by a proof of FIXP-hardness for Arrow-Debreu markets with Leontief and PLC utilities [GMVY17] . For the case of Arrow-Debreu markets with CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility functions, [CPY13] show membership in FIXP but leave open FIXP-hardness.
In recent years, several researchers have proposed Hylland-Zeckhauser-type mechanisms for a number of applications, e.g., see [Bud11, HMPY18, Le17, McL18] . The basic scheme has also been generalized in several different directions, including two-sided matching markets, adding quantitative constraints, and to the setting in which agents have initial endowments of goods instead of money, see [EMZ19a, EMZ19b] .
The Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme
Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] gave a general mechanism for a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their formulation is as follows: Let A = {1, 2, . . . n} be a set of n agents and G = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n indivisible goods. The mechanism will allocate exactly one good to each agent and will have the following two properties:
• The allocation produced is Pareto optimal.
• The mechanism is incentive compatible.
The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is a marriage between linear Fisher market and fractional perfect matching. The agents will reveal to the mechanism their desires for the goods by stating their von Neumann-Mogenstern utilities. Let u ij represent the utility of agent i for good j. We will use language from the study of market equilibria to describe the rest of the formulation. For this purpose, we next define the linear Fisher market model.
A linear Fisher market consists of a set A = {1, 2, . . . n} of n agents and a set G = {1, 2, . . . , m} be a set of m infinitely divisible goods. By fixing the units for each good, we may assume without loss of generality that there is a unit of each good in the market. Each agent i has money m i and utility u ij for a unit of good j. If x ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ m is the bundle of goods allocated to i, then the utility accrued by i is ∑ j u ij x ij . Each good j is assigned a non-negative price, p j . Allocations and prices, x and p, are said to form an equilibrium if each agent obtains a utility maximizing bundle of goods at prices p and the market clears, i.e., each good is fully sold and all money of agents is fully spent.
In order to mold the one-sided market into a linear Fisher market, the HZ scheme renders goods divisible by assuming that there is one unit of probability share of each good. An allocation to an agent is a collection of probability shares over the goods. Let x ij be the probability share that agent i receives of good j. Then, ∑ j u ij x ij is the expected utility accrued by agent i. Each good j has price p j ≥ 0 in this market and each agent has 1 dollar with which it buys probability shares. The entire allocation must form a fractional perfect matching in the complete bipartite graph over vertex sets A and G as follows: there is one unit of probability share of each good and the total probability share assigned to each agent also needs to be one unit. Subject to these constraints, each agent should buy a utility maximizing bundle of goods. By definition, under such an allocation and prices, the market clears. We will define these to be an equilibrium allocation and prices; we state this formally below after giving some preliminary definitions. respectively. We will denote these by size(i), cost(i) and value(i), respectively. 1. The total probability share of each good j is 1 unit, i.e., ∑ i x ij = 1.
2. The size of each agent i's allocation is 1, i.e., size(i) = 1.
3. The budget of each agent is 1 dollar and price of each good is non-negative. 4. Subject to these constraints, each agent i maximizes her expected utility, i.e., maximize value(i), subject to size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1.
Using Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the following is shown:
[Hylland and Zeckhauser [HZ79] ] Every instance of the one-sided market defined above admits an equilibrium.
Note that unlike the linear Fisher market, in which at equilibrium each agent i must spend her money m i fully, in the HZ scheme, i need not spend her entire dollar. Pareto optimality of the allocation follows from the well-known fact that allocations made at market equilibrium are Pareto optimal. Finally, if this "market" is large enough, no individual agent will be able to improve her allocation by misreporting utilities nor will she be able to manipulate prices. For this reason, the HZ scheme is Pareto optimal in the large.
As stated above, Hylland and Zeckhauser transform the original matching market problem, involving indivisible goods, to fractional assignments of probability shares of the goods, in order to render them divisible and bring to bear the vast machinery of market equilibria on the problem. However, their interest is still in solving the original problem, and to this end, they view each agent's allocation as a lottery over goods. In this viewpoint, agents accrue utility in an expected sense from their allocations. Once these lotteries are resolved in a manner faithful to the probabilities, an assignment of indivisible goods will result. As is well known, since the assignment is Pareto optimal ex ante, it will also be Pareto optimal ex post. Rather than executing the lotteries in a banal manner, Hylland and Zeckhauser give an elegant randomized procedure for rounding which uses randomness more efficiently.
Properties of Optimal Allocations and Prices
Let p be given prices which are not necessarily equilibrium prices. An optimal bundle for agent i, x i , is a solution to the following LP, which has two constraints, one for size and one for cost.
Taking µ i and α i to be the dual variables corresponding to the two constraints, we get the dual LP:
Clearly µ i is unconstrained. µ i will be called the offset on i's utilities. By complementary slackness, if x ij is positive then α i p j = u ij − µ i . All goods j satisfying this equality will be called optimal goods for agent i. The rest of the goods, called suboptimal, will satisfy α i p j > u ij − µ i . Obviously an optimal bundle for i must contain only optimal goods. The parameter µ i plays a crucial role in ensuring that i's optimal bundle satisfies both size and cost constraints. If a single good is an effective way of satisfying both size and cost constraints, then µ i plays no role and can be set to zero. However, if different goods are better from the viewpoint of size and cost, then µ i attains the right value so they both become optimal and i buys an appropriate combination. We provide an example below to illustrate this.
Example 4. Suppose i has positive utilities for only two goods, j and k, with u ij = 10, u ik = 2 and their prices are p j = 2, p k = 0.1. Clearly, neither good satisfies both size and cost constraints optimally: good j is better for the size constraint and k is better for the cost constraint. If i buys one unit of good j, she spends 2 dollars, thus exceeding her budget. On the other hand, she can afford to buy 10 units of k, giving her utility of 20; however, she has far exceeded the size constraint. It turns out that her optimal bundle consists of 9/19 units of j and 10/19 units of k; the costs of these two goods being 18/19 and 1/19 dollars, respectively. Clearly, her size and cost constraints are both met exactly. Her total utility from this bundle is 110/19. It is easy to see that α i = 80/19 and µ i = 30/19, and for these settings of the parameters, both goods are optimal.
We next show that equilibrium prices are invariant under the operation of scaling the difference of prices from 1.
Lemma 5. Let p be an equilibrium price vector and fix any r > 0. Let p ′ be such that ∀j ∈ G, p ′ j − 1 = r(p j − 1). Then p ′ is also an equilibrium price vector.
where the last inequality follows by using ∑ j∈G x ij = 1.
Using Lemma 5, it is easy to see that if the allocation x provides optimal bundles to all agents under prices p then it also does so under p ′ . In the rest of this paper we will enforce that the minimum price of a good is zero, thereby fixing the scale. Observe that the main goal of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is to yield the "correct" allocations to agents; the prices are simply a vehicle in the market mechanism to achieve this. Hence arbitrarily fixing the scale does not change the essential nature of the problem. Moreover, setting the minimum price to zero is standard [HZ79] and can lead to simplifying the equilibrium computation problem as shown in Remark 6.
Remark 6. We remark that on the one hand, the offset µ i is a key enabler in construing optimal bundles, on the other, it is also a main source of difficulty in computing equilibria for the HZ scheme. We identify here an interesting case in which µ i = 0 and this difficulty is mitigated.
In particular, this holds for all agents in the unit case presented in Section 4. Suppose good j is optimal for agent i, u ij = 0 and p j = 0, then it is easy to check that µ i = 0. If so, the optimal goods for i are simply the maximum bang-per-buck goods; the latter notion is replete in market equilibrium papers, e.g., see [DPSV08] .
Finally, we extend Example 4 to illustrate that optimal allocations for the Hylland-Zeckhauser model do not satisfy the weak gross substitutes condition in general.
Example 7. In Example 4, let us raise the price of k to 0.2 dollars. Then, the demands for j and k become 4/9 and 5/9, respectively. Notice that the demand for j went down from 9/19 to 4/9. One way to understand this change is as follows: Let us start with the old allocation of 10/19 units of k. Clearly, the price of this allocation of k goes up from 1/19 to 2/19, leaving only 17/19 dollars for j. Therefore size of j needs to be reduced to 17/38. However, now the sum of the sizes becomes 37/38, i.e., less than a unit. We wish to increase this to a unit while still keeping cost at a unit. The only way of doing this is to sell some of the more expensive good and use the money to buy the cheaper good. This is the reason for the decrease in demand of j.
Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Bivalued Utility Functions
In this section, we will study the restriction of the HZ scheme to bivalued utility functions; moreover, the bivalued sets can be different for different agents. More precisely, for each agent
Using a perfect matching algorithm and the combinatorial algorithm [DPSV08] for linear Fisher markets, we will first give a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the unit case, i.e., when all utilities u ij are 0/1. Next we will argue that this same algorithm can handle the previous problem.
We need to clarify that we will not use the main algorithm from [DPSV08] , which uses the notion of balanced flows and l 2 norm to achieve polynomial running time. Instead, we will use the "simple algorithm" presented in Section 5 in [DPSV08] . Although this algorithm is not proven to be efficient, the simplified version we define below, called Simplified DPSV Algorithm below, is efficient; in fact it runs in strongly polynomial time, unlike the balanced-flows-based algorithm of [DPSV08] . Remark 6 provides an insight into what makes the unit case computationally easier.
Notation: We will denote by H = (A, G, E) be the bipartite graph on vertex sets A and G, and
If ν is a matching in H, ν ⊆ E, and (i, j) ∈ ν then we will say that ν(i) = j and ν(j) = i. For any subset S ⊆ A (S ⊆ G), N(S) will denote the set of neighbors, in G (A), of vertices in S.
Algorithm 9. Algorithm for the Unit Case 1. If H has a perfect matching, say ν, then do: If H has a perfect matching, the matter is straightforward as stated in Steps 1a and 1b; allocations and prices are clearly equilibrium. For Step 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8. The following hold:
is a smaller vertex cover for H, leading to a contradiction.
The first part of Lemma 8 together with Hall's Theorem implies that a maximum matching in H[A 2 , G 2 ] must match all agents. Therefore in Step 2a, each agent i ∈ A 2 is allocated one unit of a unique good from which it derives utility 1; clearly, this is an optimal bundle for i. The number of goods that will remain unmatched in G 2 at the end of this step is |G 2 | − |A 2 |.
Allocations are computed for agents in A 1 as follows. First, Step 2e uses the Simplified DPSV Algorithm, which we describe below, to compute equilibrium allocations and prices for the submarket consisting of agents in A 1 and goods in G 1 . At the end of this step, the money of each agent in A 1 is exhausted; however, her allocation may not meet the size constraint. To achieve the latter, Step 2f allocates the unmatched zero-priced goods from G 2 to agents in A 1 . Clearly, the total deficit in size is |A 1 | − |G 1 |. Since this equals |G 2 | − |A 2 |, the market clears at the end of Step 2f. As shown in Lemma 10, each agent in A 1 also gets an optimal bundle of goods.
Let p be the prices of goods in G 1 at any point in this algorithm. As a consequence of the second part of Lemma 8, the equilibrium price of each good in G 1 will be at least 1. The Simplified DPSV algorithm will initialize prices of goods in G 1 to 1 and declare all goods active. The algorithm will always raise prices of active goods uniformly 3 .
For S ⊆ G 1 let p(S) denote the sum of the equilibrium prices of goods in S. A key notion from [DPSV08] is that of a tight set; set S ⊆ G 1 is said to be tight if p(S) = |N(S)|, the latter being the total money of agents in A 1 who are interested in goods in S. If set S is tight, then the local market consisting of goods in S and agents in N(S) clears. To see this, one needs to use the flow-based procedure given in [DPSV08] to show that each agent i ∈ N(S) can be allocated 1 dollar worth of those goods in S from which it accrues unit utility. Thus equilibrium has been reached for goods in S.
As the algorithm raises prices of all goods in G 1 , at some point a set S will go tight. The algorithm then freezes the prices of its goods and removes them from the active set. It then proceeds to raise the prices of currently active goods until another set goes tight, and so on, until all goods in G 1 are frozen.
We can now explain in what sense we need a "simplified" version of the DPSV algorithm. Assume that as some point, S ⊂ G 1 is frozen and goods in G 1 − S are active and their prices are raised. As this happens, agents in A 1 − N(S) start preferring goods in S relative to those in G 1 − S. In the general case, at some point, an agent i ∈ (A 1 − N(S)) will prefer a good j ∈ S as much as her other preferred goods. At this point, edge (i, j) is added to the active graph. As a result, some set S ′ ⊆ S, containing j, will not be tight anymore and will be unfrozen. However, in our setting, the utilities of agents in (A 1 − N(S)) for goods in S is zero, and therefore no new edges are introduced and tight sets never become unfrozen. Hence the only events of the Simplified DPSV Algorithm are raising of prices and freezing of sets. Clearly, there will be at most n freezings. One can check details in [DPSV08] to see that the steps executed with each freezing run in strongly polynomial time, hence making the Simplified DPSV Algorithm a strongly polynomial time algorithm 4 . Lemma 10. Agents in A 1 will get optimal bundles of goods.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm freezes k sets, S 1 , . . . S k , in that order; the union of these sets being G 1 . Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . p k be the prices of goods in these sets, respectively. Clearly, successive freezings will be at higher and higher prices and therefore, 1 ≤ p 1 < p 2 < . . . < p k , and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, p j = |N(S j )|/|S j |. If i ∈ N(S j ), the algorithm will allocate 1/p j amount of goods to i from S j , costing 1 dollar.
By definition of neighborhood of sets, if i ∈ N(S j ), then i cannot have edges to S 1 , . . . S j−1 and can have edges to S j+1 , . . . , S k . Therefore, the cheapest goods from which it accrues unit utility are in S j , the set from which she gets 1 dollar worth of allocation. The rest of the allocation of i, in order to meet i's size constraint, will be from G 2 , which are zero-priced and from which i gets zero utility. Clearly, i gets a utility maximizing bundle satisfying both size and cost constraints.
Since all steps of the algorithm, namely finding a maximum matching, a minimum vertex cover and running the Simplified DPSV Algorithm, can be executed in strongly polynomial time, we get:
Lemma 11. Algorithm 9 finds equilibrium prices and allocations for the unit case of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme. It runs in strongly polynomial time.
Theorem 12. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme under bivalued utility functions.
Proof. For each agent i, we will first replace a i by 0 and b i by 1 and run Algorithm 9 to find equilibrium allocation and prices. We next observe that this equilibrium also solves the original bivalued problem. Clearly, every agent in A 2 will receive an optimal bundle. For an agent i in A 1 , observe that i gets the lower utility good at zero price. Hence, it should send all its money on the higher utility good, which it does.
Characterizing Optimal Bundles
In this section we give a characterization of optimal bundles for an agent at given prices p which are not necessarily equilibrium prices. This characterization will be used critically in Section 8 and to some extent in Section 6. Notation: For each agent i, let G * i ⊆ G denote the set of goods from which i derives maximum utility, i.e., G * i = arg max j∈G {u ij }. With respect to an allocation x, let B i = {j ∈ G | x ij > 0}, i.e., the set of goods in i's bundle.
We identify the following four types of optimal bundles. Type A bundles: α i = 0 and cost(i) < 1.
By complementary slackness, optimal goods will satisfy u ij = µ i and suboptimal goods will satisfy u ij < µ i . Hence the set of optimal goods is G * i and B i ⊆ G * i . Note that the prices of goods in B i can be arbitrary, as long as cost(i) < 1. Type B bundles: α i = 0 and cost(i) = 1.
The only difference from the previous type is that cost(i) is exactly 1. The reason for distinguishing the two types will become clear in Section 8. Type C bundles: α i > 0 and all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
Recall that good j is optimal for i if 5 α i p j = u ij − µ i . Suppose goods j and k are both optimal. Then u ij = u ik and α i p j = u ij − µ i = u ik − µ i = α i p k , i.e., p j = p k . Since α i > 0, by complementary slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, we get that each optimal good has price 1. Type D bundles: α i > 0 and not all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
Suppose goods j and k are both optimal and u ij = u ik . Then α i p j = u ij − µ i = u ik − µ i = α i p k , i.e., p j = p k . Therefore optimal goods have at least two different prices. Since α i > 0, by complementary slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, there must be an optimal good with price more than 1 and an optimal good with price less than 1. Finally, if good z is suboptimal for i, then α i p z < u iz − µ i .
An Irrational Example
Our example has 4 agents A 1 , . . . , A 4 and 4 goods g 1 , . . . , g 4 6 . The agents' utilities for the goods are given in Table 1 , with rows correspond to agents and columns to goods. The quantity −∞ stands for a sufficiently large negative number −M (−M ≤ −20 suffices). If desired, we can shift up the utilities so that they are nonnegative. 
30 −∞ Thus, agents A 1 and A 2 like, to varying degrees, three goods only, g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , while agents A 3 and A 4 like two goods each, {g 1 , g 3 } and {g 2 , g 3 }, respectively. The precise values of the utilities are not important; the important aspects are: which goods each agent likes, the order between them, and the ratios u 14 −u 12 u 12 −u 11 and u 24 −u 22 u 22 −u 21 . Notice that the latter are unequal. We will show that this example has two equilibrium solutions. In both solutions, agents A 3 and A 4 buy the two goods that they like. In one solution, A 1 buys only the goods g 2 and g 4 , and A 2 buys all three goods g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , while in the other solution, A 1 buys all three goods g 1 , g 2 , g 4 and A 2 buys g 1 and g 4 only. In both solutions, the minimum price of a good is 0 and the price of the other three goods is irrational.
Lemma 13. Equilibrium prices satisfy:
The equilibrium bundle of each agent is of Type D and contains goods having positive utilities only.
Proof. Suppose p 3 ≤ 1. Then agents A 3 and A 4 will demand 1 unit each of good g 3 , leading to a contradiction. Similarly, if p 4 ≤ 1 then A 1 and A 2 will demand 1 unit each of g 4 . Therefore, p 3 , p 4 > 1. Since the maximum utility goods of every agent have price > 1, all agents spend exactly 1. Therefore, the sum of the prices of the goods is 4.
Suppose p 2 = 0 ≤ p 1 . Then A 1 , A 2 , A 4 do not buy g 1 , since they prefer g 2 and it is weakly cheaper than g 1 . Therefore A 3 must buy the entire unit of g 1 . Clearly A 1 , A 2 do not buy g 3 , since they prefer g 2 . Therefore, the only agent who buys g 3 is A 4 ; however, she cannot afford the entire unit of g 3 since p 3 > 1, contradicting market clearing. Therefore p 2 > 0 and hence the 0-priced good is g 1 and p 1 = 0 < p 2 . Furthermore, p 2 + p 3 + p 4 = 4.
Next suppose p 2 ≥ 3/4. Then p 4 = 4 − (p 2 + p 3 ) < 9/4. For both agents A 1 and A 2 , a combination of g 1 and g 4 in proportion 2:1 has a price less than 3/4 for one unit and utility 20, and is therefore preferable to g 2 . Hence, A 1 , A 2 will not buy any g 2 , and since A 3 does not buy any g 2 either, since she prefers g 1 , it follows that A 4 must buy the entire unit of g 2 . This is possible only if p 2 = 1 and A 4 buys nothing else; in particular, she does not buy any g 3 . Clearly, A 1 , A 2 do not buy any g 3 since they prefer g 1 . Therefore the entire unit of g 3 must be bought by A 3 , which is impossible because p 3 > 1. Hence p 2 < 3/4. These facts together with p 1 = 0 < p 2 < 1 < p 3 , p 4 imply that the agents' bundles are not Type B or C. Therefore they are all of Type D.
Finally we prove that none of the agents will buy an undesirable good. For A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , such a good is dominated by another lower-priced good. Since p 4 > 1, A 4 does not buy g 4 . Suppose agent A 4 buys good g 1 . Since she spends 1 dollar, she must also buy g 3 . Therefore we have:
, which contradicts p 2 < 3/4. Therefore, no agent buys any undesirable good.
Lemma 14. One of the agents A 1 , A 2 buys all three desirable goods. If A 1 buys g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , then A 2 buys g 1 , g 4 only. If A 2 buys g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , then A 1 buys g 2 , g 4 only.
Proof. Since all the bundles are of Type D, every bundle has at least two goods; clearly, every good is bought by at least two agents.
Suppose that every agent buys two goods and every good is bought by two agents. If so, one of A 1 , A 2 must buy g 1 , g 4 and the other must buy g 2 , g 4 . Consider the graph with the goods as nodes and an edge joining two nodes if they are bought by the same agent. This graph must be the 4-cycle g 1 , g 4 , g 2 , g 3 , g 1 . Therefore for some a, 0 < a < 1, each agent buys a units of one good and b = 1 − a units of the second good and each good is sold to two agents in the amounts of a and b.
Let r i = |1 − p i |. Observe that for every edge (g i , g j ) of the cycle, one price is < 1 and the other price is > 1, and we have ap i + bp j = 1. Therefore ar i − br j = 0, and r i r j = b a . Hence
which implies that all the r i are equal. Therefore p 1 = p 2 , contradicting the previous claim that p 1 < p 2 . Hence at least one of A 1 , A 2 will buy all three of her desirable goods.
Suppose that A 1 buys all three desirable goods g 1 , g 2 , g 4 . Then we have α 1 p j + µ 1 = u 1j for j = 1, 2, 4. Therefore, (p 4 − p 1 )/(p 4 − p 2 ) = (u 14 − u 11 )/(u 14 − u 12 ) = 30/20. Agent A 2 buys g 4 and at least one of g 1 , g 2 . Suppose she buys g 2 . Then α 2 p j + µ 2 = u 2j for j = 2, 4, hence α 2 (p 4 − p 2 ) = u 24 − u 22 = 25. This implies that α 2 (p 4 − p 1 ) > 30 = u 24 − u 21 , hence α 2 p 1 + µ 2 < u 21 , a contradiction. Therefore A 2 does not buy g 2 and she buys g 1 and g 4 only.
Next suppose A 2 buys all three desirable goods g 1 , g 2 , g 4 . By a similar argument we will prove that A 1 buys only two goods. We have α 2 p j + µ 2 = u 2j for j = 1, 2, 4. Therefore, (p 4 − p 1 )/(p 4 − p 2 ) = (u 24 − u 21 )/(u 24 − u 22 ) = 30/25. Agent A 1 buys g 4 and at least one of g 1 , g 2 . Suppose that she buys g 1 . Then α 2 p j + µ 2 = u 2j for j = 1, 4, hence α 2 (p 4 − p 1 ) = u 24 − u 21 = 30. This implies that α 2 (p 4 − p 2 ) > 20 = u 14 − u 12 , hence α 2 p 2 + µ 2 < u 12 , a contradiction. Therefore, A 1 does not buy g 1 , hence she buys g 2 and g 4 only.
Theorem 15. The instance of Table 1 has two equilibria; in both, allocations to agents and prices of goods, other than the zero-priced good, are all irrational. Proof. Let r i = |1 − p i |. By Lemma 13, r 1 = 1. We consider the two cases established in Lemma 14.
Case 1. A 1 buys g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , and A 2 buys g 1 , g 4 .
Agent A 3 spends her dollar on goods g 1 , g 3 in the proportion r 3 : r 1 , i.e., r 3 : 1. Therefore, x 31 = r 3 1+r 3 , x 33 = 1 1+r 3 . Agent A 4 buys goods g 2 , g 3 in the proportion r 3 : r 2 . Therefore, x 42 = r 3 r 2 +r 3 , x 43 = r 2 r 2 +r 3 . Since only agents A 3 and A 4 buy good g 3 , we have x 31 = 1 − x 33 = x 43 , and x 42 = 1 − x 43 = x 33 . This implies r 2 3 = r 2 ... (1). Since agent A 1 buys g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , we have, u 14 −u 12 u 12 −u 11 = p 14 −p 12 p 12 −p 11 . Therefore r 2 + r 4 = 2(1 − r 2 ) ... (2) .
Agent A 2 buys goods g 1 , g 4 in the proportion r 4 : r 1 . Therefore, x 21 = r 4 1+r 4 , x 24 = 1 1+r 4 . Hence, x 14 = 1 − x 24 = r 4 1+r 4 . Since g 2 is bought by A 1 and A 2 only, we have x 12 = 1 − x 42 = r 2 r 2 +r 3 . Since the cost of A 1 's bundle is 1, p 1 x 11 + p 2 x 12 + p 4 x 14 = 1. Therefore, (1 − r 2 ) r 2 r 2 +r 3 + (1 + r 4 ) r 4 1+r 4 = 1. Hence, (1 − r 2 )r 2 + (r 4 − 1)(r 2 + r 3 ) = 0 ... (3). Now we have three equations, (1), (2) and (3), in three unknowns r 1 , r 2 , r 3 . Using (1) and (2) we can express r 1 and r 2 in terms of r 3 . Letting r 3 = y, we have from (1), r 2 = y 2 , and from (2), r 4 = 2 − 3r 2 = 2 − 3y 2 . Substituting into (3), we get (1 − y 2 )y 2 + (1 − 3y 2 )(y 2 + y) = 0, which simplifies to y(y + 1)(4y 2 − y − 1) = 0.
The only positive solution is y = 1+ √ 17 8 . Therefore,
,
Once we have the value of y, we get:
r 1 = 1, r 2 = y 2 , r 3 = y and r 4 = 2(1 − y 2 ) − y.
Since this example has disconnected equilibria, we get:
Corollary 16. The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme does not admit a convex programming formulation.
Remark 17. Observe that in both equilibria, the allocations of all four agents are irrational even though each one of them spends their dollar completely and the allocations form a fractional perfect matching, i.e., add up to 1 for each good and agent.
The Class FIXP
The class FIXP was introduced in [EY10] . Recall that basic complexity classes, such as P, NP, NC and #P, are defined via machine models. For the class FIXP, the role of a "machine model" is played by one of the following: a straight line program, an algebraic formula, or a circuit; further it must use the standard arithmetic operations of +, -* /, min and max. These restrictions imply that the function defined by this "machine" is guaranteed to be continuous.
The quintessential complete problem for the class FIXP is Nash equilibrium; this was established in [EY10] . A three-player game may have only irrational equilibria; this was pointed out by Nash himself [Nas51] . Corresponding to a three-player game, Nash defined a continuous function on a closed, compact domain via an algebraic formula and showed that the fixed points of this function must be equilibria for the game. Since Brouwer's Theorem guarantees existence of fixed points, each such game must admit an equilibrium. [EY10] used this same formula for establishing their result.
The problem of computing an equilibrium for a k-player game, for k ≥ 3, game is FIXP-complete in [EY10] . In contrast, a two-player bimatrix game always admits rational equilibria and computing it is PPAD-complete [DGP09, CDT09] ; the class PPAD was defined in [Pap94] . The two classes, PPAD and FIXP seem to be quite disparate: whereas PPAD is contained in function classes NP ∩ co-NP, the class FIXP lies somewhere between P and PSPACE, and is likely to be closer to the harder end of PSPACE.
Since we will establish membership in FIXP using straight line programs, we provide further details on this "machine model" for FIXP. Such a program should satisfy the following:
1. The program does not have any conditional statements, such as if ... then ... else.
2. It uses the standard arithmetic operations of +, -* /, min and max.
It never attempts to divide by zero.
A total problem is one which always has a solution, e.g., Nash equilibrium and Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium. A total problem is in FIXP if there is a polynomial time algorithm which given an instance I of length |I| = n, outputs a polynomial sized straight line program which computes function F(I) on a closed, convex, real-valued domain D(n). Because of the restrictions imposed the straight line program, function F(I) will be continuous and by Brouwer's Theorem, has at least one fixed point. We require that each fixed point of F(I) be a solution to instance I. Hence, a proof of membership in FIXP requires us to provide the domain for function F and a straight line program which defines F.
Membership in FIXP
Let p and x denote the allocation and price variables. We will give a function F over these variables and a closed, compact, real-valued domain D for F. The function will be specified by a polynomial length straight line program using the algebraic operations of +, −, * , /, min and max, hence guaranteeing that it is continuous. We will prove that all fixed points of F are equilibrium allocations and prices, hence proving that Hylland-Zeckhauser is in FIXP.
Notation:
We will denote the set {1, . . . .n} by [n]. x i will denote agent i's bundle. For each agent i, choose one good from G * i and denote it by i * . Domain D = D p × D x , where D p and D x are the domains for p and x, respectively, with
can be viewed as being composed of n + 1 vectors of variables, namely p and for each i ∈ [n], x i . Similarly, we will view F as being composed of n + 1 functions, F p and for each i ∈ [n], F i , where p ′ = F p (p, x) and for each i ∈ [n], x ′ i = F i (p, x). The straight line programs for F p and F i are given in Algorithm 18 and Algorithm 19, respectively. It is easy to see that if F i alters a bundle, the new bundle still remains in the domain; in particular, ∀i ∈ [n], size(i) = 1.
Requirements on F:
Observe that (p, x) will be an equilibrium for the market if, in addition to the conditions imposed by the domain, it satisfies the following:
3. ∀i ∈ [n], x i is an optimal bundle for i.
Function F has been constructed in such a way that if any of these conditions is not satisfied by (p, x), then F(p, x) = (p, x), i.e., (p, x) is not a fixed point of F. Equivalently, every fixed point of F must satisfy all these conditions and is therefore an equilibrium.
Lemma 20. If (p, x) is a fixed point of F, as defined in Algorithms 18 and 19, then Corollary 22. If (p, x) is a fixed point with a zero-priced good, then no step of F will change (p, x).
Next, we observe that if the set of distinct utilities of i, {u ij | j ∈ G}, is a singleton, then any bundle satisfying size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1 is optimal. Henceforth we will assume that this set has at least two elements.
Lemma 23. If (p, x) is a fixed point of F, as defined in Algorithms 18 and 19, then x i is an optimal bundle for i at prices p.
Proof. We will consider the following exhaustive list of cases. Each contradiction is based on applying Corollary 22. We will assume that α i and µ i are the optimal variables of the dual to i's optimal bundle LP and that u = max j {u ij }.
Case 1: Assume that cost(i) < 1. If B i ⊆ G * i , then Steps 3 and 4 will kick in, contradicting the fact that (p, x) is a fixed point. Therefore B i ⊆ G * i . Clearly, u is the maximum utility that i can derive from a bundle satisfying size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1. Therefore, x i is an optimal bundle for i. Since cost(i) < 1, by complementarity α i = 0 and hence x i is a Type A optimal bundle.
Henceforth, we will assume that cost(i) = 1.
Case 2:
Assume that i derives the same utility from all goods j ∈ B i and B i ⊆ G * i . As in the previous case, x i is an optimal bundle for i and hence each good in B i is optimal. If ∃ j, k ∈ B i such that p j = p k , then we get
implying α i = 0. In this case, x i is a Type B bundle.
Otherwise, since cost(i) = 1, size(i) = 1 and all goods in B i have the same price, each good in B i has price 1. Now, x i is either a Type B or a Type C bundle depending on whether α i = 0 or α i > 0. However, the latter condition cannot be discerned from x i ; fortunately, it does not matter.
Case 3:
Assume that i derives the same utility from all goods j ∈ B i and B i ⊆ G * i . Let k be a good in B i and let z be a good having price 0. Each good in B i must be a minimum price good having utility u ik , since otherwise Step 5 of F i will alter the bundle. Since cost(i) = 1, size(i) = 1 and all goods in B i have the same price, each good in B i has price 1.
Let l be a good such that u il > u ik ; observe that any good in G * i is such a good. We will prove that p l > 1 = p k . Clearly u iz < u ik , since otherwise Step 5 will kick in a change the bundle. Hence we have u iz < u ik < u il . However, since Step 6 did not kick in,
Hence we can conclude that the optimal bundle for i at prices p is not a Type A or Type B bundle.
Next, assume for the sake of contradiction that x i is not an optimal bundle for i at prices p; in particular, this entails that the optimal bundle for i is not Type C. Therefore, i's optimal bundle must be Type D and k is a suboptimal good. As argued in Section 5, an optimal Type D bundle must contain a good of price < 1 and a good of price > 1; let j and l be such goods, respectively. Clearly u iz < u ik < u il . Then we have, α i p j = u ij − µ i , α i p k > u ik − µ i and α i p l = u il − µ i Subtracting the first from the second and the second from the third we get
Therefore, Step 6 should kick in, leading to a contradiction. Hence x i is a Type C optimal bundle.
Henceforth, we will assume that cost(i) = 1 and ∃ s, t ∈ B i with u is < u it .
Case 4: Assume that the set {u ij | j ∈ G} has exactly two elements. Clearly, these utilities must be u is and u it . Now, s must be the zero-priced good, since otherwise Step 5 will kick in. Since cost(i) = 1 and size(i) = 1, p t > 1. Again since Step 5 didn't kick in, s and t must be the cheapest goods having utilities u is and u it . Therefore, x i is a Type D optimal bundle.
Case 5: Assume that the set {u ij | j ∈ G} has three or more elements. Since size(i) = 1 and cost(i) = 1, ∃ t ∈ B i , s.t. p t > 1. Now, any good having utility u must have price > 1, since otherwise
Step 5 will alter the bundle. Therefore, x i cannot be a Type A or Type B bundle. Therefore, α i > 0.
Suppose that x i is not an optimal bundle. Then there are two cases: that the optimal bundle is Type C or Type D. In the first case, let k ∈ G be an optimal good; p k = 1. Let j, l ∈ B i with p j < 1 < p l and at least one of j or l is suboptimal. Clearly, u ij < u ik < u il , otherwise
Step 5 will kick in. Therefore we have α i p j ≥ u ij − µ i , α i p k = u ik − µ i and α i p l ≥ u il − µ i , with at least one of the inequalities being strict. Therefore,
Step 7 should kick in, leading to a contradiction. Hence x i is a Type C optimal bundle.
Next suppose the optimal bundle is Type D. There are two cases. First, ∃ k ∈ B i such that k is a suboptimal good for i and there are optimal goods j and l with u ij < u ik < u il . Then we have
Therefore, Step 6 should kick in, leading to a contradiction.
Second, that there is no such good j ∈ B i . Let v and w be optimal goods with the smallest and largest utilities for i. Then all suboptimal goods in B i have either less utility than u iv or more utility than u iw . Suppose there are both types of goods, say j and l, respectively. Then Step 7 should kick in with the triple j, v, l. Else there is only one type, say j with u j < u v . Then ∃ l ∈ B i with p l > 1. Now, Step 7 should kick in with the triple j, v, l. In the remaining case, ∃ j, l ∈ B i with p j < 1 and u il > u iw . Now, Step 7 should kick in with the triple j, w, l.
The contradictions give us that x i does not contain a suboptimal good and is hence a Type D optimal bundle.
Lemmas 20 and 23 give:
Theorem 24. The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is in FIXP.
Discussion
The main problem remaining is to determine if the HZ scheme is FIXP-hard. Another obvious open problem is to obtain efficient algorithms for computing approximate equilibria, suitably defined. Beyond this, generalizations and variants of the HZ scheme deserve attention, most importantly to two-sided matching markets [EMZ19a] .
Encouraged by success on the unit case, we considered its generalization to the case of {0, 1 2 , 1} utilities. However, resolving whether this case always has a rational equilibrium is quite nontrivial and we leave it as an open problem. Furthermore, it will not be surprising if even this case is intractable; resolving this is a challenging open problem.
